In political discourse regarding the Middle East, Iran has frequently been in the spotlight of US foreign policy, oftentimes in a negative light. The September 25 issue of the New York Times reported that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran stated that he considered the dispute over his country’s nuclear program “closed” and that Iran would not abide by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), rather choosing instead to defer to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which Iran and the United States are both signatories, every country has the right to nuclear development for peaceful purposes - energy would be a prime example (Article IV.1).
Ahmadinejad’s rationale is that the nuclear issue for Iran is not a “political” one to be decided by the Security Council, but a “technical” one that should be decided by an agency in charge of regulating energy - nuclear in this situation. It is worth noting that the IAEA has observed that the United States has roughly 100 nuclear power plants, which provide 20% of the energy consumed here. As the US continues its slow transition away from oil and coal-based electricity production, it is likely that other countries will follow suit. Given that nuclear energy provides a fifth of our own power, opposition to Iran’s nuclear energy program is logically unsound.
The Bush Administration brushed off his assertion, standing by the belief that Iran is insincere about its uranium enrichment program. This comes while the United States and several European powers are attempting to increase the pressure on Iran through sanctions approved by the UNSC. The economic situation for Iran is looking rather dire right now, particularly because more European-based banks are refusing to lend new capital to the country, making it difficult to invest in modern infrastructure which would help to reduce its dependence on oil and its potentially volatile role in the Middle East. In particular, the fact that oil facilities remain technologically stagnant actually increases Iran’s need for an alternative source of power; and an obvious one is nuclear. In September, UN inspectors were working in Iran, trying to find answers to questions that the government had thus far refused to openly disclose. It is critical for the UNSC to allow them to complete their inspections, lest we repeat the unfortunate mistakes of Iraq.

Even if Iran maintains transparency with its nuclear program – peaceful or otherwise - it would still currently be in violation of the UNSC’s resolutions against it, which include a complete halt on the enrichment of uranium for any purpose. These resolutions are counter-productive to non-proliferation, because the hypocrisy is clear and unavoidable.
The common argument against so-called “rogue states” such as Iran (or previously, Iraq) by the United States is that they will use energy programs as a cover for weapons development. A problem here is that the US government itself continues to develop new nuclear weapons – such as a “mini-nuke” or “bunker buster” – and thus far is not particularly open to beginning negotiations regarding its own nuclear disarmament. In addition, the current administration’s stated willingness to use nuclear weapons in potential future conflicts against non-nuclear states does little to defuse tensions.
The Bush Administration’s latest criticism of Iran continues a long trend of accusations of dishonesty – and thus far very little progress has been made diplomatically, either through direct talks or negotiations because few have been attempted. Neither the US or Iran are seriously complying with Article VI of the NPT which states, “All countries involved in negotiations regarding effective measures on preventing a nuclear arms race are to do so in good faith, as well as those regarding general and complete nuclear disarmament under effective international control.
Accusing Iran of nuclear weapons development and singling out its program regardless of evidence or lack thereof - presents both logical and legal problems. First we can examine the logical aspect. From a stance of self preservation, a world leader might argue:

1) Why should only a few powerful countries have nukes?
2) Won’t they use these to enhance their ability to pressure and/or bully other countries?
3) Why shouldn’t others have the right to develop nukes as well?

This line of argument is supported and utilized by countries such as North Korea and Israel, who would benefit from this; particularly since they are not signatories to the NPT. To many governments, possessing nuclear weapons appears attractive, especially for those who feel threatened and outclassed by current world powers in conventional military force. Nations with conventional militaries look to the contrast between the fate of Iraq, and that of North Korea. =
The policies of the United States regarding nuclear power have helped to exacerbate a spiraling self-destructive cycle - the US is developing more weapons, citing fear and mistrust of other countries as its justification. Other countries also desire these weapons that are capable of wreaking havoc and destruction on a horrific scale, ostensibly to deter foreign invasion. As we saw with Ahmadinejad, world leaders regularly can and do cite the same concerns that the US has, and justifiably note the hypocrisy and self-contradiction by existing nuclear powers when they cite opposition to Iran’s own programs.

Legally, it is hard for nuclear powers to order and enforce other nations to cut back or avoid nuclear proliferation while not enforcing the law for themselves or their allies. Powerful countries such as the US, China, Great Britain, Russia, France, etc. already have nuclear weapons and continue to create more (already violating NPT treaties). Under international law, it would be hard to prosecute Russia and Iran for their uranium deal while the US had hypocritically made a similar nuclear energy deal with India. One option available to the UNSC is to prosecute “allied” countries along with so-called “rogue states”; this is obviously not an attractive option for US-Indian relations, especially when the government views India as vital in counterbalancing a China growing in international influence. The other option is to turn a blind eye to proliferation in regimes that are friendly to the West. But as noted before, this sort of behavior significantly weakens the logical argument against proliferation by other states.

Double-standards set by the US and the UN Security Council are not new or surprising, but nonetheless they are detrimental to ending nuclear proliferation. The United States cannot expect Iran to fully follow the rules set in the NPT if the former is unwilling to limit its own development of nuclear weaponry. In 1999, the US Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and over the past six years under the Bush Administration, no attempt has been made to re-submit it to the Senate. The United States also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, which not only dismayed non-nuclear powers, but also Russia..The Security Council merely verbally condemned China and France, for conducting nuclear weapons tests. Yet when India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, it faced tough sanctions for doing essentially the same thing. Similar measures were foisted onto Pakistan when it tested its own weapons.
For non-nuclear states, the lack of reciprocity from the existing superpowers in reducing their nuclear armaments is morally reprehensible and hypocritical; hence there is little moral high ground stopping states from developing their own weapons – only the threat of military force remains. Until the nuclear powers change their approach towards ending nuclear proliferation, it is unlikely that others will cease and desist.