As the military occupation in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan continue, a pressing question is occasionally brought up in Congress or the media but never discussed in detail – where the manpower for these prolonged missions comes from, and the results of extended time spent in a combat zone.

The United States has now officially lost 4000 soldiers in Iraq. As we contemplate our 5th anniversary of the military occupation in Iraq, it is important to take note of not only what has been reported on, but also things that have flown under the radar. Missing from most discussion about the occupation is a debate about where the manpower for this prolonged mission comes from, and the side effects of extended time spent in a combat zone.

One such method is the infamous “Stop Loss” clause in the military enlistment contract that keeps soldiers in combat involuntarily after their tour is up, ostensibly to retain experienced soldiers that may have left otherwise.
Originally created by Congress after the Vietnam War, it has been legally justified on the basis of Title 10, United States Code, Section 12301(d) which states in part: “The President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States” complemented by the Armed Forces Enlistment Contract which states: “In the event of war, my enlistment in the Armed Forces continues until 6 months after the war ends, unless the enlistment is ended sooner by the President of the United States.”

Since the invasion began, some 160,000 soldiers occupy Iraq. These soldiers are supplemented by 180,000 mercenaries, who are on average paid four or five times what enlisted soldiers earn. In addition the President has ordered a Stop Loss on more than 60,000 soldiers to remain in combat beyond the normal end of their enlistment. These are undeniable symptoms of personnel shortage, particularly in a conflict that may give the Vietnam War a run for its money in length. While the army repeatedly notes that it is not suffering recruitment problems serious enough to make staying in Iraq logistically impossible, the fact of the matter is that it takes time to train soldiers, particularly those prepared for the nuances and unpredictably of urban counterinsurgency warfare. Because the army is unable to replenish equally qualified soldiers to the front line at the rate in which they would normally be returning home, many veterans – some of which have already completed 3 tours or more – are being forced to stay yet again.

This dark side of the volunteer army is sometimes brushed aside on the grounds that, “They signed the contract. They should have known what they were in for.”  Vice President Dick Cheney himself used this logic when discussing the 4000th US death during an interview with ABC News. While this may be the case legally, it is worthwhile to question the morality and sustainability of the situation – if enlistment and retention rates are not high enough to sustain a military occupation; it is likely that there is a problem with motivation and mission.

The Surge that started in the summer of 2007 was in part made possible due to Stop Loss. The 30,000 ‘extra’ US soldiers added to the effort arrived there primarily in three different ways – redeployment from other theaters – notably Afghanistan, accelerated and shortened training periods in the United States, and extension of tours for some personnel already in the theater. The extended tours are taking there toll,  President Bush’s War Czar, Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute said, “Come the spring [2008], some variables will have to change – either the degree to which the American ground forces, the Marines and the Army in particular, are deployed around the world to include Iraq, or the length of time they’re deployed in one tour, or the length of time they enjoy at home. Those are, essentially, the three variables.”
This is part of a disturbing trend in which those that actually fight our wars are in essence being ignored in various ways – the increasingly unreasonable sacrifice they are forced to make, and the lack of follow-up care after they return to the States.

This is illustrated by another factor that deserves much more attention and scrutiny – that pertaining to health care afforded to veterans. Most notably, media coverage on the extremely unsatisfactory conditions at Walter Reed Military hospital brought the situation to light. Yet given that the military healthcare system was not afforded increased resources proportional to the number of soldiers wounded or traumatized (note that the occupation of Iraq has been the bloodiest operation since Vietnam), the poor conditions should not have been altogether too surprising. To his credit, the President did assemble a panel of bureaucrats to look into the issue. On March 2007, the panel delivered a report on ways and means to fix the military healthcare system, with Defense Secretary Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Nicholson directed to take the recommendations seriously and implement them.

Yet almost one year after the President’s commission reported on military healthcare, the situation still requires much improvement. The veterans advocacy group “Veterans for America” released a report on February 13, 2008 (Fort Drum: A Great Burden, Inadequate Assistance), which noted the deficiencies in the military healthcare system, and various factors that play a role in aggravating the situation.

The report takes notice of the strain on the army, with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as an example – the BCT recently completed its fourth tour. All in all, it was been deployed for more than 40 months since September 11. Yet even for companies who have not been deployed for such extreme periods of time there is the Army-wide problem of inadequate “dwell time”—the time between deployments to readjust, rest, retrain,  visit family and friends, and integrate new unit members. None of the 2nd BCT’s three dwell times have risen to the Army’s traditional goal of a 2:1 dwell and deployment ratio. A further complication was the decision to extend Army tours in Iraq from 12 to 15 months in April 2007 – an effect that mental health experts note is quite difficult on a soldier psychologically.

This only covers the combat deployments – after the soldiers return there is still much work to be done that thus far has been handled incompetently. Problems noted in the report included insufficient numbers of psychiatrists treating mental trauma and lack of confidentiality (which is particularly crucial in treating mental health). That said, Fort Drum does deserve praise for treating psychological wounds as legitimate combat wounds.

The situation is not the kind easily summed up in a sound bite on nightly news – it’s not as straightforward as, “The President has vowed to intensify efforts to quell the insurgency.” Yet it is something that is equally as important. People devoting their lives to the country do not lose their value once they leave the combat zone; follow-up is crucial and something that the University itself is also trying to adapt to (with mixed results), as evidenced by policies attempting to help reintegrate veterans into college, or handicapped access in the Big House.

There may not be any easy solutions to the situation. Certainly, increasing the funding for health care and post-deployment education opportunities is something that ought to be done, but in addition to that, general public perception must change. “Supporting the Troops” needs to be more than a bumper sticker slogan, and it’s more than waving around an American flag. It’s about taking notice of “little” details like what happens to soldiers after they come home, and making sure all are afforded the opportunities they deserve. It’s the least we can do.